How we avoided side-channels in our new post-quantum Go cryptography libraries

Published

2025-11-14 12:00

Collected

2026-07-03 03:29

---
id: 1322
title: "How we avoided side-channels in our new post-quantum Go cryptography libraries"
source_domain: blog.trailofbits.com
source_url: "https://blog.trailofbits.com/2025/11/14/how-we-avoided-side-channels-in-our-new-post-quantum-go-cryptography-libraries/"
published_at: "2025-11-14 12:00"
tags: ["open-source", "cryptography", "post-quantum", "go", "side-channel", "ml-dsa", "slh-dsa"]
phying_url: "https://phying.com/item/1322"
lang: en
---

# How we avoided side-channels in our new post-quantum Go cryptography libraries

## Summary

Trail of Bits released constant-time pure Go implementations of the post-quantum signatures ML-DSA (FIPS-204) and SLH-DSA (FIPS-205), avoiding division and branch timing leaks like KyberSlash.

## Intelligence Metadata

- **Sources:** blog.trailofbits.com
- **Published:** 2025-11-14 12:00
- **Original:** https://blog.trailofbits.com/2025/11/14/how-we-avoided-side-channels-in-our-new-post-quantum-go-cryptography-libraries/
- **Phying News:** https://phying.com/item/1322