PPhying中文
Curated security research, vulnerabilities, advisories and tools for practitioners.

Secure Messaging Apps and Group Protocols, Part 2

blog.quarkslab.com | research | #cryptography | #privacy | #e2ee | #protocols | #mls | #messaging
📄 Raw .md⬇️ Download .md🔗 Original ↗

Summary

Part two of the secure messaging series: extending end-to-end encryption to group chats, an overview of current solutions, and a look at the IETF's Messaging Layer Security (MLS).
Published
Collected

Related coverage

research · blog.quarkslab.com
Secure Messaging Apps and Group Protocols, Part 1
Part one of the secure messaging series: key properties of end-to-end encrypted 1-on-1 conversations, with examples analyzed using the Verifpal symbolic verification tool.
blog · blog.trailofbits.com
Better Encrypted Group Chat
An intern built molasses, a Rust implementation of the MLS draft-6 protocol, showing how tree-based group keying scales end-to-end encrypted group chat beyond pairwise and sender-key schemes.
blog · blog.trailofbits.com
How Trail of Bits helps verify the integrity of your Signal chats
Trail of Bits explains Signal's Automatic Key Verification key-transparency system and describes the independent auditor it operates, one of three signers that make server key substitution detectable.
research · blog.quarkslab.com
State of Post-Quantum Cryptography implementations
In this blogpost, we first review the landscape of Post-Quantum Cryptography implementations across some of the most popular cryptographic libraries. Following that, we present the results of a differential fuzzing campaign on few of the presented implementations.
research · blog.quarkslab.com
Mattermost End-to-End Encryption Plugin
Quarkslab's open-source end-to-end encryption plugin for Mattermost: its threat models (passive vs active attackers), design, known limitations and self-hosting instructions.
research · blog.quarkslab.com
iMessage Privacy
iMessage privacy analysed: messages are end-to-end encrypted, but Apple controls the key infrastructure and could read conversations on request or at will, and holds the metadata anyway; HITB 2013.
Back