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Security Assessment of OpenVPN

blog.quarkslab.com | research | #security-audit | #cryptography | #vulnerability | #openvpn | #ostif | #quarkslab
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Summary

OSTIF-funded security assessment of OpenVPN 2.4.0: 50 man-days of code and cryptography review that uncovered pre-auth and post-auth DoS bugs (CVE-2017-7478/7479) plus an info leak, fixed in 2.4.2.
Published
Collected

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