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Back from CppCon 2016

blog.quarkslab.com | research | #conference | #report | #llvm | #cpp | #undefined-behavior | #quarkslab
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Summary

Trip report from CppCon 2016: the C++ Costless Abstractions talk, SCM challenge puzzles, a uftrace poster and sessions on undefined behavior, plus the takeaway that there is always more C++ to learn.
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