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A brief survey of Fully Homomorphic Encryption, computing on encrypted data

blog.quarkslab.com | research | #cryptography | #privacy | #secure-computation | #quarkslab | #fhe | #homomorphic-encryption
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Summary

A brief survey of Fully Homomorphic Encryption: from Gentry's 2009 bootstrapping breakthrough onward, covering how computation can be delegated on encrypted data without revealing secrets.
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